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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Abuse Defined 
"Assault" and "abuse," although often legally indistinguish-
able, have quite different connotations. Texas law has long defined 
assault as a criminal act without reference to the circumstances 
surrounding it.1 The definition of abuse, on the other hand, incor-
porates surrounding circumstances. Texas law identifies abuse as 
violence used by one person against another who stands in a spe-
cial relationship to that person. Thus, the feature that distin-
guishes abuse from assault is the relationship between the victim 
and the assailant. Wife abuse, husband abuse, child abuse, and 
abuse of the elderly are the most visible and recognized types of 
abuse.2 
Although the terms "wife," "husband," and "spouse" indicate 
a formal, legal relationship between cohabitants, any useful discus-
sion of abuse extends to any persons living together in an arrange-
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1. TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. §§ 22.01-.08 (Vernon 1974). 
2. Child abuse and elderly abuse are, respectively, the first and latest forms of abuse 
to have produced public reaction. Much has been done in formulating legal responses to 
child abuse. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1974). Far less has been ac-
complished in preventing abuse of the elderly. 
1279 
1280 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1279 
ment that removes them from the traditional concept of criminal 
assault by one stranger on another. In Texas, family violence has 
been defined in the newly enacted Family Protection Act as "the 
intentional use or threat of physical force by a member of a family 
or household against another member of the family or house-
hold .... "3 This definition realistically avoids the term "wife-
beating" as too simplistic a description of abusive relationships. 
Instead, the Act encompasses the presently recognized range of as-
saultive conduct within both formal and informal family units. 
B. Focus and Methodology 
Of the various kinds of abuse described, spouse abuse has re-
ceived the least attention in relation to its frequency. Therefore, 
this study and the recommendations made in it address only abuse 
between adult cohabitants of similar ages. For the purpose of this 
study, the sex of the victim will play no distinguishing role. Wife 
abuse is, of course, considerably more common than husband 
abuse,• but either brand of assault occurs with enough frequency 
to warrant consideration. 11 
In discussing abuse, commentators tend to stress the evolution 
of social attitudes from the righteous defense of a husband's right 
to beat his wife to present concern for a social problem of consider-
able magnitude.6 However, this study will focus on the civil and 
criminal legal alternatives available in Texas for dealing with 
abuse and will consider how current and proposed systems may 
protect victims more effectively and deter abusers. 
This study will rely on empirical studies because such observa-
tions can reveal the direction legal systems should take and 
pinpoint the flaws and shortcomings in present legal responses to 
abuse. Although some of these observations merely acknowledge 
apparently irremediable systemic deficiencies, on the whole they 
3. TEx. FAM. ConE ANN. § 71.01(b)(2) (Vernon 1979). 
4. Domestic Violence and Legislation with Respect to Domestic Violence: Hearings 
on S. 1728 Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. 
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978). 
5. Straus, Wife Beating: How Common and Why?, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 443, 447-48 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 5, at 444; Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic 
Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HoFSTRA L. 
REv. 95, 97 (1980); Comment, Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for a Historic Problem, 84 
DicK. L. REv. 147, 150 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Spouse Abuse]; Comment, 
Wife Beating: Law and Society Confront the Castle Door, 15 GoNz. L. REv. 171, 173 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Wife Beating]. 
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form the essential background for possible reform. 
C. The Scope of Abuse 
The difficulty of assessing the extent of spouse abuse increases 
the difficulty of finding an effective legal remedy. Abuse, like rape, 
is far less likely to be reported than other crimes. 7 Any reported 
statistical incidence rate probably represents only a fraction of the 
actual number of abuse cases. In addition, spouse abuse is hard to 
define in any meaningful statistical manner because of the variety 
of forms it takes. Some social scientists have established a violence 
scale for measuring more accurately the kinds and degrees of abuse 
reported. 8 This is an important methodological advance, although 
inaccuracies in reporting continue to plague data collection con-
cerning abuse. 
Law enforcement agencies are probably the most common 
sources of information about abuse. Unfortunately, there is no uni-
form reporting system for gathering even fundamental information 
about abuse. Those reports which are taken are often colored by 
the police officer's perception of the problem and the lack of a 
clear-cut definition of abusive conduct. Pushing, shoving, slapping, 
and similar acts may be abuse to one officer and normal communi-
cation to another. Medical service agencies, another potential 
source of information, are not required to report suspected spouse 
abuse as they are child abuse. However, even if that data were 
available, Texas has no central information gathering agency. In 
spite of the failure to document incidents of abuse adequately, the 
available information shows a need for immediate action. The lack 
of an adequate information gathering system itself suggests the 
monumental proportions of the problem. 9 
7. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 174. 
8. Straus, supra note 5, at 448. 
9. One of the most widely quoted studies on the incidence of abuse concluded from a 
sample of 2,143 couples that approximately 1.8 million American wives are abused by their 
husbands on a yearly basis. /d. at 445. For purposes of this study, only acts carrying a high 
risk of serious injury to the victim were considered. When one takes into account the under-
reporting tendencies in this kind of study, statisticians estimate that fifty or sixty percent of 
all couples experience some level of abuse, rather than the twenty-eight percent who re-
ported it. /d. at 447. If this estimate is correct, approximately twelve million wives can ex-
pect to experience abuse from their husbands. Other studies have estimated that one-third 
to one-half of married women have been subjected to spousal violence. Taub, supra note 6, 
at 95. Another researcher estimated that from one million to twenty-eight million women 
are battered. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 174. These estimates suggest that 
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The unavailability or unreliability of statistics on the inci-
dence of spouse abuse in Texas is largely due to a historical indif-
ference to abuse as a major social concern. It is clear, however, that 
the number of cases of spouse abuse in Texas alone may be in the 
millions. 
II. THE NATURE OF SPOUSE ABUSE 
Before turning to a discussion of the three broad categories of 
legal remedies for abuse and their respective levels of adequacy, 
one must have some understanding of the circumstances of abuse. 
To combat abuse, one must appreciate its character, participants, 
and impact. 
A. Violent Abuse 
Statistics from the 1978 Uniform Crime Reports for reported 
murders and non-negligent homicides in which a husband or wife 
was the victim indicate that 4.3% of the men killed nationally were 
killed by their wives.1° For the same year, 5.6% of the women 
killed died at the hands of their husbands.11 These percentages 
mean that approximately 804 husbands were killed by their wives 
and 1047 wives by their husbands. 12 In all, over 1850 spouses were 
killed by their partners. 13 
The incidence of spousal homicide in Texas is difficult to de-
termine because of the way statistics are reported, but some fairly 
accurate guesswork may be attempted. In 1978, 1853 murders and 
non-negligent manslaughter crimes were reported in Texas.14 An 
extrapolation of national percentages indicates that approximately 
183 people were killed by their mates in Texas during 1978.16 The 
abuse is dangerously close to being the rule rather than the exception. 
10. CRIMINAL JusTICE CENTER, U.S. DEP'T oF JusTICE, SouRCEBOOK oF CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE STATISTICS-1980, at 312 (1981) (hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK-1980]. 
11. /d. 
12. /d. 
13. /d. See also Fields, Representing Battered Wives, Or What to Do Until the Police 
Arrive, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025, 4027 (Apr. 5, 1977). 
14. SouRCEBOOK-1980, supra note 10, at 306. 
15. /d. at 312. In 1977, the Texas Department of Public Safety extracted its own data 
of crime in Texas before the information was further distilled for inclusion in the national 
statistics. See TEx. DEP'T Pus. SAFETY, CRIME IN TExAs (1977). Those figures more accu-
rately reflect the scope of spousal homicide in Texas. A total of 159 homicides occurred 
involving husbands and wives. /d. at 17. Another 48 involved common-law marriages, and 14 
former spouses died. /d. Boyfriends and girlfriends accounted for an additional 21 deaths. 
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expansion of the definition of "spouse" to more realistic parame-
ters would increase dramatically the number of people included. 
These deaths-the most concrete evidence of spousal 
abuse-demonstrate the significance of the problem. Clearly, most 
of the deaths do not occur as the result of the first abusive epi-
sode. 18 One may logically assume that each death represents the 
culmination of many assaults. 
Spousal assault is far more common than spousal homicide. In 
1969, Mulvihill and Tumin examined the records of nearly 1500 
aggravated assaults for, among other factors, the personal relation-
ship between the victim and offender.17 Aggravated assaults be-
tween husbands and wives, whether the marriage was formal or 
common law, accounted for 9.4% of the total, and an additional 
2.9% were attributed to those in a relationship defined as "par-
amour."18 Not surprisingly, the same study revealed that 26.3% of 
all aggravated assaults occurred in the home, an environment sur-
passed Only by the Street a8 the SCene Of SUCh aSSaUlts. Ill 
In 1978, police reported aggravated assaults numbering 28,475 
in Texas20 and 534,592 nationally. 21 The figures of Mulvihill and 
Tumin, when applied to these reported offenses, indicate that as 
many as 3787 aggravated assaults between spouses or cohabitants 
could have occurred in Texas during the same year, and as many 
as 71,233 nationally for that period.22 
One must remember that these figures, as high as they are, 
reflect only those offenses known to police and may not always re-
flect the seriousness of the assault. Since underreporting is com-
mon in spouse abuse,28 figures on aggravated assault between 
mates may be highly inaccurate. 24 
/d. Altogether, 242 people were killed by someone with whom they had experienced ties of 
affection or marriage at some time. /d. 
16. Taub, supra note 6, at 96; Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 156. 
17. CRIMINAL JusTICE CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, SouRCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE STATISTJCS-1973, at 197 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SouRCEBOOK-1973]. 
18. /d. 
19. /d. at 196. 
20. SouRCEBOOK-1980, supra note 10, at 306. 
21. /d. at 308. 
22. SouRCEBOOK-1973, supra note 17, at 197. 
23. Straus, supra note 5, at 447. 
24. A recent and alarming study of spousal assaults in Kentucky indicates that 4.1% 
of the married women in that state experienced severe abuse during the 12 mon.ths preced-
ing the study. Over 33,000 wives or cohabitating partners experienced assault that would 
constitute aggravated assault or class A misdemeanor assault in Texas, and nearly 70,000 
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B. Nonviolent Abuse 
The most common form of nonviolent abuse is verbal. Purely 
verbal abuse, without any element of threat or incitement to a 
breach of the peace, cannot be regulated without conflict with first 
amendment protections. 211 The Texas Penal Code specifically ex-
cludes as justifiable the use of force in response to verbal provoca-
tion alone.26 Although verbal abuse is not subject to civil or crimi-
nal sanctions, such verbal abuse nevertheless may lead to physical 
abuse. 
A more tangible form of nonviolent abuse involves interfer-
ence with property rights of the victim. This kind of abuse can 
literally strip away the financial resources of the victim, effectively 
bar costly legal remedies, and break down the victim's desire to 
pursue any action against the abuser. Interference with property 
rights can range from squandering community income to destruc-
tion of property. 
C. The Profile of Abusive Spouses 
A character profile of potential abusers is invaluable in assur-
ing that these people and their victims will be identified and 
steered toward the legal resources created to assist them. Again, 
the contradictory data available suggest the need for additional 
information. 
Dr. F.G. Bolton, Jr., a social scientist who has done considera-
ble work in the field of spouse abuse, characterizes abusive families 
as of predominately lower socioeconomic status.27 Dr. Bolton's the-
ory of economic factors as a dominant feature of violent families is, 
however, contradicted by other researchers, who contend that 
spouse abuse transcends class and ethnic barriers, with profession-
als contributing as much to the problem as unskilled workers. 28 
One recent study reveals that a simple characterization of 
Kentucky women are estimated to have been severely abused at some time. M. ScHULMAN, A 
SURVEY OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 13-15 (1979). 
25. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 (1969) (holding Ohio Criminal Syn-
dicalism Act unconstitutional on first amendment grounds because it failed to distinguish 
between mere inflammatory speech and incitement of imminent lawless acts) . 
26. TEx. PENAL CooE ANN. § 9.31(b)(l) (Vernon 1974). 
27. Bolton, The Domestic Violence Continuum: A Pressing Need for Legal Inter-
vention, 66 WOMEN LAw. J . 11, 13 (1980). 
28. Hamlin, The Nature and Extent of Spouse Assault, 1978 VICTIM Aovoc. 10, 14; 
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 149. 
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abusers is impossible.29 Nonwhites, urban families, and younger 
families experienced spousal violence more often than other 
groups, but all classes, races, and backgrounds were represented. 30 
Eleven percent of the women surveyed from lower income groups 
reported some violent incident during the past twelve months. 31 
Ten percent of women with family incomes between $15,000 and 
$24,999, and eight percent of women with family income of $25,000 
or more, reported such incidents. u These figures show little corre-
lation between income and violence. Education levels produced 
even more surprising results. The same study indicated that fewer 
acts of spousal violence occurred in families in which the husband 
had an eighth grade education or less than in those families in 
which the husband had finished high school or college. 33 
If these characterizations reflect the true breadth of spouse 
abuse, no quick solution will emerge from concentration on either 
free urban legal services or formalized, expensive equitable proce-
dures. Rather, the legal alternatives must reflect the diversity of 
the people involved. 
D. Characteristics of Spouse Abuse 
Factors frequently present in abuse situations also provide 
guidance for legal solutions. The first of these factors is that an 
incident of domestic violence is unlikely to be reported to police. 34 
The refusal to report abuse may indicate a lack of confidence or 
trust in the ability of the police to handle the situation, a reluc-
29. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, at 17. 
30. Id. 
31. ld. 
32. ld. 
33. Id. Stereotypical conceptions about spouse abusers seem inaccurate in light of 
these results. The study concluded: 
The collective portrait of the abusive and violence-prone family is hardly distin-
guishable from the profile of the average family on the street. While there is some 
tendency for these families to be urban, young, and nonwhite, violence-prone fam-
ilies are found across the broad social spectrum-middle class and lower class, 
nonwhite and white, urban and rural. 
Id. at 18. 
34. ld. at 36. Kentucky abuse victims who indicated a very high incidence rate re-
vealed that only 9% of the incidents were reported to police. Nonwhite and lower-income 
victims filed reports more than twice as often as other victims surveyed, a fact that might 
explain the stereotypical view of the likelihood of abuse in those classes. Since the Kentucky 
survey dealt only with abused women, there is no indication of how many abused males fail 
to report abuse, but the figure may well exceed that of the nonreporting females. ld. 
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tance to invoke the sanctions of the criminal justice system, or a 
general desire to work out the matter within the family. 
Another salient factor is the abuse of alcohol. Some research-
ers have estimated that from forty to ninety-five percent of abuse 
incidents involve alcohol. 311 A recent study of police response to 
abuse calls indicates that the police perceive alcohol as an impor-
tant element in their decision to arrest. 36 Although alcohol has not 
been conclusively shown to be a primary contributor to physical 
abuse, sufficient evidence exists to indicate its importance. More 
study of the connection between alcohol and spousal violence is 
therefore essential. 
A final and alarming observation about abuse is that it seems 
more likely to occur in families in which the victim was raised by 
abusive parents.37 In one study, women recalling family violence 
towards their own mothers were themselves victims more often 
than women whose fathers rarely or never acted violently toward 
their mothers by a ratio of twenty-eight percent to seven percent.38 
E. The Societal Impact of Abuse 
An often overlooked aspect of abuse is its economic cost. Soci-
etal response to abuse requires expensive services. In the legal sys-
tem alone, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, private attor-
neys, civil and criminal courts, courts of appeal, and the 
corresponding probation, parole, and clerical personnel attached to 
the system have become involved, often unwillingly, in the ramifi-
cations of abuse. 
For instance, consider the economic impact of a relatively un-
complicated assault case. Police officers are called from other du-
ties and, because of the danger that domestic calls present, two 
officers are required to respond. The offender, if arrested, must be 
jailed at public expense. A public prosecutor must prepare and 
possibly try the case. If any judicial disposition is made, additional 
administrative expenses are incurred by the probation office, cor-
rection facility, or the court. Civil actions also create judicial costs, 
although the parties usually bear more of the expense. Divorce ac-
35. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 176. 
36. Berk & Loseke, "Handling" Family Violence: Situational Determinants of Po-
lice Arrest in Domestic Disturbances, 15 L. & Soc'v REv. 317, 339 (1981). 
37. M. ScHULMAN, supra note 24, at 29; Taub, supra note 6, at 96; Comment, Wife 
Beating, supra note 6, at 177. 
38. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, a_t 29. 
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tions, tort claims, custody hearings, or simple anxiety take their 
toll, as do losses of property or expendable income. 
Spousal assault will not be as expensive to remedy as it is to 
tolerate. Abuse is not a minor inconvenience for those unfortunate 
enough to experience it: it is a monstrous social ill that shows 
every sign of spreading: Many states have taken steps to combat 
this problem, but no simple unilateral legislative approach will 
overcome this Hydra. Texas has delayed responding to this prob-
lem, and much remains to be done. 
Ill. LEGAL INTERVENTION ALTERNATIVES 
Currently, the broad categories of legal alternatives available 
to the abused spouse are crimin&l prosecution, civil remedies, and 
protective orders-a newly formed equitable device. The criminal 
justice alternatives include substantive and procedural criminal 
law designed for or adapted to abuse situations,3' as well as the 
intervention of the police,40 'prosecutors,41 and courts42 in applying 
these laws and sanctions. 
A. Civil Actions 
No single approach to civil redress can provide a complete so-
lution to spousal abuse. On the contrary, procedural, substantive, 
and practical problems make each approach inadequate in assist-
ing some class of litigants. Yet, taken as a whole, the spectrum of 
civil alternatives offers important opportunities to protect and 
compensate the victim. 
1. Peace Bonds. Peace bonds have often been issued in cases 
of family violence as an inexpensive and readily available deter-
rent. 43 Although a bond is essentially criminal in nature/4 the par-
ties and even the court issuing the bond may consider it as a civil 
remedy because there is no direct criminal sanction for its viola-
39. Refer to notes 89-109 infra and accompanying text. 
40. Refer to notes 110-39 infra and accompanying text. 
41. Refer to notes 140-43 infra and accompanying text. 
42. Refer to notes 144-51 infra and accompanying text. 
43. If the accused is required to post bond, he, as opposed to the victim, must pay the 
cost of the proceeding. TEx. ConE CRIM. Paoc. ANN. art. 7.14 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982-
1983). The victim need only prove that there is just reason to believe that the threat will be 
carried out. Id. art. 7.03. 
44. See id. arts. 7.01-.17 (procedure for obtaining and enforcing peace bonds). 
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tion, 411 and because the device is commonly employed prior to the 
commission of a violent criminal act.46 
As a practical matter, any remedy in the field of spousal abuse 
must be available quickly and inexpensively. Its availability must 
be widely known, and it must address the needs of the spouse re-
quiring abuse protection. It is just this availability that has meta-
morphosed the peace bond into a common protective device for 
spousal assault. 
Because peace bonds are usually administered by justice 
courts,47 they are easily accessible.48 The geographical distribution 
of such courts makes them the most convenient forum for judicial 
intervention.49 In addition, the informality associated with the jus-
tice court encourages pro se filing and prosecution of petitions with 
minimal court costs. The resulting frequency of peace bonds as a 
violence control device insures that victims will know of the exis-
tence of this remedy and will seek it out in time of need. 
Despite the availability of peace bonds, their effectiveness in 
deterring spousal assault is questionable. A peace bond is available 
as an alternative only when the spouse has threatened violence but 
has not actually acted upon the threat.110 Undoubtedly, many 
spousal assaults begin with threats, but a large number begin with 
physical contact. A peace bond is an inappropriate remedy for past 
assaultive episodes. Addressing this situation, Texas law specifies 
that if evidence presented at a peace bond hearing indicates that 
the accused has actually committed a crime, he shall be tried for 
that crime.111 The bond may be forfeited to the state if its condi-
tions are violated. Because the funds used to post the bond proba-
bly come from community property, the victim is essentially pay-
45. ld. arts. 7.13, 7.17. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-6669 (1945). 
46. When a peace bond issues, the accused is required to "keep the peace toward the 
person threatened or about to be injured . ... " TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.03 
(Vernon 1977). 
47. Article 7.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires a magistrate to issue 
a warrant for the arrest of a person accused of threatening an offense against the person or 
property of another whenever the magistrate is informed upon oath of the threatened crime. 
/d. art. 7.01. This provision is mandatory upon any magistrate to whom sworn application is 
made. Jd. However, custom has relegated this function almost exclusively to the justice 
court. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 537 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). 
48. Each county in Texas must have no fewer than four precincts, each with its own 
justice of the peace. TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 2351, § 1 (Vernon 1971). 
49. See generally id. §§ 1, 7 (authorization to establish courts). 
50. TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 7.03 (Vernon 1977). 
51. /d. art. 7.13. 
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ing a portion of the abuser's fine. Similarly, if the abuser is unable 
to post bond and is incarcerated, the potential victim must often 
suffer the loss of the abuser's income as well as face the unhappy 
prospect of the angered abuser's eventual release. 
In spite of the difficulties inherent in the peace bond proce-
dure and pattern of sanctions, the peace bond remains somewhat 
effective as a deterrent. The efficacy of any legal protection de-
pends in large part upon its ability to shape behavior, and in this 
respect the peace bond has built an admirable record upon a weak 
foundation. Simply stated, it is the belief of the victim and the 
abuser in the procedure that makes it work. While hardly an im-
posing body in the context of the entire legal system, the justice 
court may well represent the only visible representative of social 
order with which the parties have been involved. Therefore, one 
cannot underestimate the effectiveness of such orders as practical 
and useful tools in deterring domestic violence, especially when di-
vorce is not a desirable alternative. 
2. Divorce. Divorce has been termed "[t]he most effective 
civil remedy" for spouse abuse&2 and is often a logical response for 
a victim. But it is not always the remedy chosen. &s 
In addition to the natural reluctance many feel toward divorce 
over what may be perceived as a temporary, sporadic, or relatively 
minor marital problem, victims avoid divorce for more practical 
reasons. These concerns include the expense of the proceedings, 
the lack of financial support, the unavailability of child care or 
shelter facilities, religious restrictions, and the fear of reprisal. &• 
52. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 187. 
53. As one commentator stated: 
[I]t is unreasonable to expect all women to seek divorce of their abusers. Some 
may believe it will be possible to control the violence and remain together; some 
may be opposed to divorce for religious reasons; and others may simply need 
breathing space to determine what they will ultimately do. 
Taub, supra note 6, at 97-98. See also M . ScHULMAN, supra note 24, at 29; Comment, Wife 
Beating, supra note 6, at 177. 
54. Unlike many states, Texas does not require fault grounds for divorce, TEX. FAM. 
CooE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975), thereby affording an option of privacy to the abuser and 
victim. In states requiring fault grounds, a spouse may endure considerable abuse before 
suit can be filed. Taub, supra note 6, at 99; Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 157. 
One assaultive incident may be insufficient to establish cruelty, and requiring a pattern of 
abuse increases the danger to the victim. Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 157. For 
states requiring fault grounds, see Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 187 -88; Com-
ment, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
135, 158-59 (1977). 
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Financial inability is the major obstacle to divorce proceedings 
for perhaps most victims. Financial responsibility for children, 
community debts, or responsibility for maintaining community 
property may make divorce literally impossible regardless of the 
victim's willingness to divorce.&& Attorneys usually charge fees 
based upon the professional effort expended and the complexity of 
the proceedings. A simple, uncontested divorce may be within the 
means of many, but the expense of restraining orders, counseling, 
investigations, and litigation often place the most effective aspects 
of divorce beyond the reach of victims of spouse abuse. 
If the victim does seek a divorce, the abused spouse will usu-
ally attempt to have temporary orders entered during the pen-
dency of the divorce proceeding. A temporary order may be issued 
to prevent physical or mental abuse of the spouse or children116 and 
destruction or concealment of property.'17 Additionally, upon appli-
cation for a temporary injunction and after notice and a hearing, 118 
a court may order support payments or division of property, or 
may give one party exclusive possession of the family residence. 119 
Additionally, the court may order counseling.60 Unfortunately, 
the Texas statute provides such counseling solely for the purpose 
of determining whether reconciliation is possible.61 While this usu-
ally may be desirable, reconciliation is often undesirable in a fam-
ily unit that has experienced abuse. Expansion of the statute to 
make counseling available, not for the sole purpose of reuniting the 
couple, but also to quantify and qualify the significance of the 
abuse involved, would be of greater benefit to victims. 
Because they have such breadth of application, temporary or-
ders or injunctions may prove especially effective in protecting a 
55. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 189-90. 
56. TEx. FAM. ConE ANN. § 3.58(a)(1)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
57. ld. § 3.58 (a)(6)-(10). 
58. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 424, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2348 (Vernon) 
(amending TEx. FAM. ConE ANN. § 3.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be recodified at 
TEx. FAM. ConE ANN. § 3.58(c)). Prior to the 1983 amendments to the Family Code, these 
remedies were available to applicants through a temporary restraining order without notice 
or hearing. Id. While the amendments decrease the breadth of the temporary restraining 
order, they do have the salutary effect of decreasing the requirements for granting an order. 
ld. (amending TEx. FAM. ConE ANN. § 3.58(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be recodified 
at TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(d)). 
59. ld. (amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be 
recodified at TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 3.58 (c)). 
60. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.54(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
61. ld. § 3.54(b) . 
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spouse seeking a divorce in an abuse case. These orders and in-
junctions share a common denominator upon which their effective-
ness turns: the court must be obeyed. A respondent who violates 
a temporary order or injunction may be held in contempt.62 How-
ever, the courts' reluctance to impose contempt may seriously un-
dermine the victim's confidence in the protection seemingly offered 
by divorce.63 Judges often hesitate to incarcerate or fine a violator 
if he promises to comply with the order in the future. In cases of 
subsequent disobedience, judges may impose sanctions, but proba-
bly not lengthy jail terms or large fines. Facilities and court time 
simply do not permit extensive imposition of sanctions. 
In addition to the administrative burden of punishing every 
violation of a civil order, there ~e other justifications for the reluc-
tance to impose sanctions. If a spouse violating a civil order is in-
carcerated, he will be unable to work and earn the money needed 
for support payments or his own maintenance. This loss of employ-
ment would only harm the abused spouse by diminishing the com-
munity estate. Ordering the payment of the victim's attorney's fees 
or assessing a fine would have a similar effect. 
Some have suggested that this situation be remedied by al-
lowing warrantless arrests for violation of injunctive orders. This 
does not, however, remove the obstacles to law enforcement.64 
Even if such arrests were permitted, courts would avoid fining or 
imprisoning first-time violators of orders, regardless of the severity 
of the violation, unless the court were convinced that the well-be-
ing of both the victim and the abuser would be served best by pun-
ishment. This assurance is frequently nonexistent. The most pro-
62. Ex parte Valdez, 521 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]1975, 
no writ). 
63. Trent, Wife Beating: A Psycho-Legal Analysis, 65 WOMEN LAw. J. 9, 15 (1979). 
64. A warrantless arrest based upon an alleged violation of an injunction differs con-
siderably from an allegation of violation of a penal statute. In the case of the latter, the 
officer has a statutory provision against which to measure the actor's conduct, and, hope-
fully, training and experience in dealing with the factors constituting probable cause to be-
lieve a violation of the statute has occurred. Arrest based upon a court order presupposes 
the validity of the order and the proper interpretation of the order by the police officer. In 
neither of these determinations is the officer qualified by education or experience. Finally, it 
must be remembered that warrantless arrests for misdemeanors are strictly limited in 
Texas. See TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 14.01-.06 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983). 
The punishment range for criminal contempt is similar to that of a misdemeanor offense. 
Compare TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. i9lla (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (penalties for con-
tempt) with TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. §§ 12.21-.23 (Vernon 1974) (penalties for 
misdemeanors). 
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ductive course for abused spouses may be to continue to obtain the 
most stringent and specific protection possible from temporary or-
ders, but to keep in mind that they may need to resort to some 
process other than contempt to punish continued abuse. 
3. Tort Actions. No one would seriously challenge the appli-
cation of tort law to an assault committed upon a person by a 
stranger. But serious obstacles, often amounting to an absolute 
bar, arise when the parties are husband and wife. To understand 
denial of the tort remedy to an abused spouse, one must recall the 
legal relationship of husband and wife prior to 1844: the marriage 
merged the legal identity of the wife into that of the husband, and 
the parties became one.611 This unity-of-marriage fiction swallowed 
the individual property rights of the wife, including the right to a 
cause of action. Since a person cannot sue himself, it followed logi-
cally that the wife, sharing the legal identity of the husband, could 
not sue her spouse. 66 
All American jurisdictions passed the Married Women's Acts, 
sometimes known as the Emancipation Acts, during the middle of 
the nineteenth century. 67 These statutes were intended to recog-
nize the property of each spouse and insure the right of the woman 
to sue and be sued in her own name for causes of action that might 
accrue to her individually.68 However, even after passage of the 
Married Women's Acts, a vestige of this historical interspousal re-
lationship remained. Based squarely upon the unity-of-marriage 
fiction, interspousal tort immunity barred a tort action, even for 
intentional torts, against a spouse,69 regardless of whether the suit 
was brought during or after marriage.70 In contravention of the in-
tended result of the Married Women's Acts, interspousal tort im-
munity persists in some jurisdictions today.71 
65. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971). 
66. /d. 
67. /d; Comment, The Battered Wife-The Legal System Attempts to Help, 48 U. 
CJN. L. REV. 419, 421 (1979). 
68. Comment, supra note 67, at 421. 
69. /d. at 420-24. 
70. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 122. 
71. /d. A variety of justifications have been propounded for the continuance of the 
immunity. Preservation of the harmony of the home was often cited as a reason to bar 
actions. Some believed that spurious law suits would result, or that collusive suits would be 
brought to defraud insurance carriers. Still others felt that other remedies, like divorce or 
criminal prosecution, were available to the injured spouse, and critics worried that the 
tortfeasor might share in the proceeds of any insurance recovery awarded for the injury. 
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Texas adopted interspousal tort immunity in 1886 with the 
decision of the supreme court in Nickerson u. Nickerson.72 The 
Nickerson immunity, typifying the doctrine, prevented suits 
brought during or after the marriage by a wife against her husband 
in tort, whether committed negligently or intentionally.73 Nicker-
son and subsequent Texas cases advanced three basic grounds for 
adoption of the immunity: disruption of marital tranquility, the 
adequacy of other forms of relief, and the problems presented by a 
wife recovering a judgment from community assets.74 
Though widely criticized, interspousal tort immunity remained 
the law in Texas until 1977 when the Supreme Court of Texas de-
cided Bounds u. Caudle.71 In Bounds, the husband had committed 
an intentional tort against his wife, causing her death.78 The chil-
dren of the deceased wife brought suit against the husband/assail-
ant for wrongful death, and they ultimately prevailed in spite of 
the Nickerson rule. In deciding Bounds, the court did not com-
pletely overturn tort immunity but merely abrogated the immunity 
for intentional torts.77 However, since an abused spouse suffers pri-
marily from intentional assault, Bounds provides a useful remedy. 
The award of community property to satisfy a tort judgment 
remains a potentially significant obstacle to interspousal litigation. 
On the most basic level, the problem may be reduced to two ques-
tions: (1) whether a tortfeasor should pay for his wrongdoing with 
funds in which the victim already has a community interest, and 
(2) once the judgment is paid, whether a tortfeasor should be able 
to share that judgment because it is community in nature. 78 Recent 
statutory changes arguably have relieved this concern,78 but no in-
While all of these concerns are legitimate in the proper context, they were merely make-
weight for continuing an immunity doctrine that patently defies public policy and has done 
so for over a hundred years. See id. 
72. 65 Tex. 281, 283 (1886). 
73. ld. 
74. ld. at 283-84; Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Beaumont 1962, writ refd n.r.e.). 
75. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977). 
76. ld. at 927. 
77. ld. 
78. For a good discussion of this problem, see generally Comment, lnterspousal Tort 
Immunity, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 291 (1978). 
79. See TEx. FAM. CooE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975) (specifying that all community 
property is subject to liability for torts committed by either spouse during the marriage). 
This provision sets up the first serious obstacle to the effective application of Bounds. If a 
spouse brings suit against an abuser, the judgment will be paid, if at all, from the nonex-
empt assets of the community. In other words, the abuse victim may bear the expense of 
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terpretive decisions permit precise outcome prediction in an inter-
spousal tort suit.80 
Interspousal tort actions have not become commonplace since 
Bounds,81 but their potential as a private compensatory mecha-
nism remains intact. This alternative should not be overlooked 
simply because it lacks familiarity. 
4. Victim Compensation Legislation. Private compensation 
systems are no longer the only available means of relief in Texas 
for some victims. In 1979, the Texas Legislature passed the Crime 
Victims Compensation Act82 to provide relief for those suffering a 
financial loss due to injury or death caused by criminal acts.83 The 
Act was established to insure compensation of victims of violent 
crime from a fund established by the legislature and administered 
by the Crime Victims Compensation Division of the Industrial Ac-
cident Board. 84 
The Crime Victims Compensation Act does not apply to most 
spouse abuse cases because denial of an application made under 
the Act is automatic if "the victim resided in the same household 
as the offender or his or her accomplice."811 This language clearly 
evidences the legislative attitude that abuse victims differ from 
other crime victims. Whether this attitude is related to the appar-
ent willingness of the abused spouse to continue the relationship or 
to concerns about the use made of any award is unclear. For those 
abuse victims who are separated or divorced at the time of the as-
sault, a remedy under the Act remains a possibility. 
The funding scheme for a public compensation act specifically 
targeted for abuse victims might imitate the present Crime Victims 
one-half of the judgment for the tortfeasor's conduct. 
80. It is ironic that Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886), also suggests a ration-
ale for avoiding sharing the tort judgment. In Nickerson, the injured spouse could not re-
cover from the joint tortfeasor spouse because of his immunity but was granted a recovery 
against a third-party joint tortfeasor. The court held the recovered damages were the sepa-
rate property of the injured spouse, since allowing the husband to share in the judgment 
would reward him for his part in the tort. Id. at 285. This "forfeiture exception" to the 
general rule that such recoveries would be community property has remained, and is essen-
tial to the vitality of interspousal tort suits. See Comment, supra note 78, at 298-99. 
81. For an example of one such interspousal tort case, see Mogford v. Mogford, 616 
S.W.2d 936, 939-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
82. TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
83. ld. § 2. 
84. ld. § 14. 
85. Id. § 6(c)(4). 
1983] SPOUSE ABUSE 1295 
Compensation Act. If court costs in criminal cases for assaults on 
spouses were the only available funds, the funding would probably 
be grossly inadequate because of our inability to identify such 
cases. But if the base of such funding were expanded to include the 
costs of suits resulting from the whole range of assaultive conduct, 
such funds could provide at least elementary support for abuse vic-
tims. Funding questions are basic to such proposals since the use 
of tax revenues may be politically impractical. The use of court 
costs is expedient because it places the burden of compensation on 
those committing the crime. 
The philosophy that applauds funding by court costs would 
undoubtedly abhor one potential use of the compensating funds. 
Compensation paid to a victim should not be shared by the perpe-
trator of the assault. This possibility is, however, very real, espe-
cially if the abuser and victim are still married. Nickerson v. Nick-
erson provided a partial solution by characterizing the 
compensating funds as the separate property of the victim.86 But 
no absolute assurance exists that the abuser will not benefit, di-
rectly or indirectly, from the compensation. This result is inevita-
ble, and must be accepted as part of the price paid for assuring 
assistance to the victim. 
Courts have often cited collusion between spouses as a reason 
for denying interspousal tort suits,87 and this argument would 
surely be renewed if a compensated victim continued to live with 
an assailant. The prohibition on this arrangement in the current 
Act88 reflects this concern. ·The only effective method of reducing 
the potential for collusion is to require the victim to divorce the 
assailant before compensating that victim. If, as the courts seem to 
believe, society is interested in maintaining the marriage regardless 
of its success, such a provision would prove unacceptable. 
Procedural safeguards to prevent the improper application of 
the assistance could surely be found. For example, the compensa-
tion could take the form of direct payments for hospital and medi-
cal expenses, thus avoiding misappropriation of the funds by the 
abuser. Using funds to provide desperately needed counseling and 
vocational services would benefit only the victim. Similarly, pro-
viding shelter facilities and emergency food and clothing for abuse 
86. 65 Tex. 281, 285 (1886). 
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 122. 
88. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
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victims would not assist the spouse abuser directly. 
Private and public compensation schemes are the frontier of 
civil legal alternatives for abuse victims. Compensation does not 
relate to prevention or retribution in a philosophical sense, but it 
does extend the legal relief available to abuse victims. 
B. Criminal Prosecution 
An abuse victim may choose criminal prosecution, the second 
major available legal alternative. Unlike civil actions, prosecution 
is public in nature and depends largely upon those administering 
the various aspects of the criminal justice system for its 
effectiveness. 
1. Substantive Law. The Texas Penal Code defines a variety 
of crimes against the person, many of which are applicable to 
abuse situations.•• These include homicide,80 assaults,81 threats81 
and harassment,83 and sexual abuse or rape.•• The Code distin-
guishes between crimes by reference to culpability and the method 
of committing the assault. 81 
The wide latitude of assaultive conduct recognized by the 
Texas assault statutes provides ample opportunity for prosecution 
of even the most minor injury." Even threats to cause bodily in-
89. See generally TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 5 (Vernon 1974). 
90. /d. § 19.01. 
91. /d. § 22.01. 
92. Refer to text accompanying notes 122-23 infra. 
93. See Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 411, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2204 (Vernon) 
(amending TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 42.07(a), (b) (Vernon 1974)) (relating to written or 
telephoned harassment). 
94. Sexual abuse or rape of a spouse has not been a criminal offense in Texas. TEx. 
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 21.04 (Vernon 1974). But recently passed legislation criminalizes 
spousal rape when a divorce action is pending or the spouses do not reside together. Act of 
June 19, 1983, ch. 977, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5311 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. 
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, 22.021). 
95. Jd. § 22.02(c). Homicide and assault, the most serious physical forms of abuse, are 
punished by reference to aggravating factors, one of which is culpability. See generally id. 
§§ 19.01-.07. Culpability, under Texas law, is defined by circumstances. To kill another 
knowingly or intentionally is murder. /d. § 19.0l(a). However, if the victim provoked the 
assailant, giving adequate cause for an act of passion, the crime is manslaughter. /d. § 
19.04(a). Under this statutory scheme, a homicide may be classified as anything from crimi-
nally negligent homicide to murder, depending on the method of commission and the mens 
rea accompanying the act. Jd. §§ 19.02, 19.07. Similarly, assault punishments range from a 
small fine to felony sentences. /d. §§ 19.02(a)(1), 22.0l(a)(3). 
96. See generally id. §§ 22.01-.08. For example, reckless infliction of bodily injury. suf-
fices for class A misdemeanor assault. /d. § 22.01(a)(l). 
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jury constitute an assault,97 as do, of course, threats of a more seri-
ous nature.98 Written or telephone harassment may also be subject 
to criminal prosecution if it is impermissibly annoying or alarming 
to the recipient. 99 
Community property law plays havoc with criminal prosecu-
tion for destruction or damage of the property of one spouse by. 
another. Since most property crimes require that the interference 
with property be committed without the effective consent of the 
owner, prosecution of a spouse for damage or destruction of prop-
erty in which the actor has a community interest presents serious 
difficulties.100 
If one looks no further than to the substantive law, the tools 
available to law enforcement should have long ago reduced the 
problem of spouse abuse to insignificance. Since this is manifestly 
not the case, and since such laws have generally been available for 
a considerable time, one may surmise that the deterrence value of 
these measures is low. Deterrence is not, however, improved by 
simply increasing the penalties for abuse related offenses or segre-
gating spouse abuse as a specific crime. 
Some states do consider spouse abuse a separate criminal of-
fense. 101 The penalties in these states range from misdemeanor to 
felony and precondition their application on proof of various phys-
ical abuses. 102 One of the oldest such laws is the California statute 
which has been in effect since 1945.103 The California approach has 
97. "Bodily injury" includes physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical con-
dition. ld. § 1.07(a)(7). 
98. ld. § 22.07(a)(2). 
99. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 411, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2204 (Vernon) 
(amending TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 42.07(a), (b) (Vernon 1974)). 
100. Section 28.05 of the Penal Code attempts to remove this impediment by statuto-
rily denying the defense that the actor has an interest in the property damaged or destroyed 
if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe. TEx. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 28.05 (Vernon 1974). Unfortunately, this section pertains only to Chapter 28 of 
the Code, and deals with damage or destruction exclusively. It is doubtful that such a provi-
sion is of much use when one spouse wants to harm the other by destroying community 
belongings, since the police would be placed in the untenable position of trying to determine 
the ownership interest of the defendant in the property and the ratio that such interest 
bears to the total value. ld. § 28.06. It is by determination of such values that the serious-
ness of the crime is assessed in Texas. Even if law enforcement officials were willing to 
accept such a task, the undesirability of allowing them to do so is evident. 
101. See generally J . HAMOS, STATE DoMESTIC VIOLENCE LAws AND How TO PAss THEM 
37 (1st ed. 1980); Comment, supra note 67, at 427. 
102. J. HAMOS, supra note 101, at 36-37. 
103. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1983). One commentator on the deterrent 
value of the California approach has found little to engender hope: 
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hinged upon one spouse (originally the husband) causing a "trau-
matic condition" in the other by reason of abuse.10' The courts in-
terpreted this language to mean that bruises or other signs of 
abuse must be visible. 1011 The problems of proof in such a require-
ment are obvious and deny the comprehensive coverage desirable 
in any such lP-gislation. 106 
To date, Texas has avoided recognition of spouse abuse or 
family violence as a distinct crime, 107 preferring to maintain these 
prosecutions as if the parties were strangers. In 1979, the Texas 
Legislature did, however, reinforce the applicability of the assault 
statutes to domestic violence by amending the laws to include the 
phrase, "including his spouse," in the basic assault language.108 
The legislature also added changes to the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure that require police to protect those threatened by abuse. 109 
Despite their shortcomings, criminal sanctions remain an es-
sential weapon in the arsenal against spouse abuse. They undenia-
bly deter some abuse and contain the potential to deter more. The 
severity of the punishment is not paramount; rather, the availabil-
As an attempt to overcome these non-interventionist policies California has made 
spouse abuse a specific statutory felony. Despite the codification of spouse abuse 
as a specific felony, however, California's criminal law remedy for victims of abuse 
appears vulnerable to police and judicial conciliatory tactics. Particularly, judges 
remain reluctant to sentence an abusive husband, a predisposition exaggerated by 
the legal requirement of establishing a "traumatic condition" from evidence that 
rapidly disappears. Statistics reiterate the dilemma faced by abused spouses. 
Since fewer than one in six felony arrests for wife or child beatings results in 
conviction and the incidence of familial violence remains high, the statute has lit-
tle deterrent effect. Thus statutorily proscribing spouse abuse appears an imper-
fect solution to the problem. 
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 156-57. 
104. A person in California is guilty of a felony if he "willfully inflicts upon his or her 
spouse ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 273.5 
(West Supp. 1983). 
105. People v. Burns, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873-74, 200 P .2d 134, 137-38 (1948). 
106. Speaking of the California statute, one writer observed: "The statute is in force, 
but its application presents some problems which have yet to be resolved. Physical injuries 
still must be present, but many husbands are adept at hitting their wives in places where 
bruises will not show." Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 199. 
107. Although the Texas Family Protection Act initially included wording suggesting 
that it may be a crime to violate a protective order, the original statute never actually made 
the violation criminal. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Violation 
is now criminal. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4049 (Vernon) 
(to be codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08). 
108. TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.01(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
109. See TEx. CoDE CRJM. PROC. ANN. arts. 6.01, 6.02, 6.03, 6.05, 6.06 (Vernon Supp. 
1982-1983). 
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ity of the substantive law, knowledge of its existence, and the law's 
swift and decisive application act as the most powerful deterrents. 
The strength of the criminal law remedy to abuse is determined by 
its availability in substantive form, the practical use of that law by 
police, the prosecution of violations, and the judicial disposition of 
such cases. 
2. Police Involvement. Police officers are the first representa-
tives of society to become involved in spouse abuse. 110 In Texas, 
police officers have a statutory duty to prevent a "threatened in-
jury"m by taking action whenever an injury to a spouse or another 
is about to occur.112 Statutory duties do not, however, describe the 
role played by police in abuse cases. To understand this interac-
tion, one must consider the factors of circumstance, experience, 
and training that the police officer brings to an abuse call. 
One such factor is the police officer's knowledge that he is 
about to become involved in one of the most dangerous situations 
in police work. Nationwide, nearly twenty percent of police deaths 
in the line of duty are attributable to domestic disturbance calls, 
and the number of fatalities among Texas officers is nearly as 
high. 113 Knowing the danger attached to these calls, the police 
might be expected to answer such calls slowly, giving the situation 
time to subside and, hopefully, resolve itself before their arrival.114 
Nevertheless, police response times do not appear to reflect wide-
spread apathy or avoidance. 1111 
Once on the scene, the police officer may opt to reconcile the 
couple, thereby avoiding escalation of the situation or increased 
danger to the officer. If the officer is skilled in mediation, this con-
ciliatory tactic may prove satisfactory. As the skill of the officer or 
the willingness of the abuser to be reconciled decreases, the likeli-
hood of successful mediation also diminishes. 
Arrest is often the only alternative to mediation. A recent 
study by Sarah Berk and Donileen Loseke assessed the determina-
tive factors in the arrest decision and yielded interesting results. 118 
110. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 318. 
111. TEx. ConE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
112. ld. art. 6.06. 
113. Trent, supra note 63, at 12; Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 185; Com-
ment, supra note 67, at 424. 
114. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 335. 
115. M. ScHULMAN, supra note 24, at 40. 
116. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 329. 
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The authors found four variables that produced statistically signif-
icant effects. 117 The most important of these factors was whether 
the victim would sign a "citizen's arrest" warrant for the police. 118 
While this procedural device is not used in Texas, many agencies 
employ the complaint form. For more serious cases, police depart-
ments may use sworn statements indicating that prosecution is 
desired. 
Berk and Loseke also· found that when both principals were 
present and the female alleged violence or the male had been 
drinking the probability of arrest rose. 119 The female's allegation of 
violence produced a far higher incidence of arrest than did allega-
tions of property damage or the mere presence of both principals 
at the scene when the police arrived. 120 It may be supposed that 
appeal to the protective instincts of the responding officer, taken 
with the continued possibility of abuse, resulted in the increased 
chances for arrest. Once the damage was done, the inclination to 
arrest declined, suggesting that police may also see criminal action 
as far more retributive than protective. When alcohol was in use 
and the principals remained on the premises, arrest was more 
likely.121 
The fourth important factor in deciding whether or not to ar-
rest seems to have a contradictory effect. If a female abuse victim 
aler~ the police to the situation, arrest probability decreases by 
nearly twenty-one percent.122 One may speculate that the reason 
for the diminished arrest rate is the belief that someone able to 
call for assistance is not so seriously in trouble as someone for 
whom help must be summoned. 123 
Until recently, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
117. /d. at 338. The four variables are "citizen's arrest," "female calls police," "both 
principals present x male drinking," and "both principals present x female only alleges vio-
lence." /d. 
118. /d. 
119. /d. at 339. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. Berk and Loseke characterized the significance of this statistic in the follow-
ing way: 
/d. 
Not only does intoxication suggest the continued volatility of the situation, and 
thus no immediate solution to the disturbance, but it may also lead to a more 
convenient arrest charge (e.g., resisting or assaulting an officer) as an alternative 
to a charge of spouse abuse. 
122. /d. at 340. 
123. /d. 
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scribed virtually all warrantless misdemeanor arrests for offenses 
not committed within the view or presence of the arresting of-
ficer!24 Warrantless felony arrests are permissible,126 but felony of-
fenses, particularly aggravated assaults, occur with far less fre-
quency than misdemeanor assaults. 
The Texas Legislature amended article 14.03 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure during its 1981 session.128 The amendment 
permits a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest when probable 
cause exists to believe that the suspect committed an assault re-
sulting in bodily injury to another person and that immediate dan-
ger of further bodily injury to that person exists.127 
The approach of the statute is two-pronged, but the second 
prong is unresponsive to the realities of abuse. Abuse cases will 
rarely present a police officer with any difficulty in establishing 
probable cause to believe an assault resulting in bodily injury has 
occurred. The obstacle to application of this arrest power will come 
from the required probable cause to believe that immediate danger 
of further bodily injury exists. 
A police officer responding to a domestic dispute in which the 
assault is over before his arrival may find the abuser has 
temporarily fled the scene. In this event, immediate danger of fur-
ther injury is gone with the attacker. Similarly, if the abuser is still 
present when the officer arrives but denies any intention of contin-
uing the abuse, facts may not exist to warrant an arrest. 
A better procedural solution is found in statutes like the 
Washington one, 118 which omits the "immediate danger" require-
ment and permits warrantless arrests upon a showing of "physical 
harm or threats of harm to any person or property."121 If police 
inaction inhibits implementation of the full deterrence of criminal 
law, that problem will not be relieved by proscribing arrests in 
124. TEx. CODE CRJM. Paoc. ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977). 
125. ld. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
126. ld., amended by Act of June 11, 1981, ch. 442, § 1, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
1865 (Vernon). 
127. TEx. CoDE CRJM. Paoc. ANN. art. 1403 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This kind of 
statute recently withstood an attack on equal protection grounds in Florida. LeBlanc v. 
State, 382 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1980). 
128. WASH. REv. CoDE § 10.31.100(1) (Supp. 1983-1984). The Washington provision 
states: "Any police officer having probable cause to believe that a person has committed or 
is committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, involving physical harm or threats of 
harm to any person or property .. . shall have the authority to arrest the person." /d. 
129. ld. 
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most situations and permitting it in only a few others. 
To optimize the role of law enforcement in violent domestic 
situations, law enforcement agencies need to initiate certain proce-
dural improvements. These improvements should include estab-
lishing a "good faith" defense for assault arrests involving family 
violence, incrf'!asing communication between social service agencies 
and law enforcement, establishing police data collection criteria for 
abuse cases, and developing police as a source of information for 
abuse victims. Added to expanded arrest capabilities and crisis in-
tervention training, implementation of these measures would en-
hance the ability of law enforcement officials to control the spouse 
abuse problem. 
Despite the recently expanded warrantless arrest proce-
dures, 130 police remain reluctant to arrest. Officers' concern that an 
arrest of one family member at the request of another will lead to a 
false arrest or malicious prosecution suit against the officers con-
tributes to this reluctance. 
Victims often promise to pursue prosecution while the officer 
is present but then refuse to prosecute a few hours later. Knowing 
this, and realizing the vulnerability of his position as the outsider 
in this triangle, the officer has no illusions about the final loyalties 
of the complainant. With this in mind, and confronted with what 
is often an invisible injury to the victim, the officer may choose to 
ignore his statutory duty and avoid arrest, regardless of his sympa-
thies. 131 Texas lawmakers should, therefore, consider establishing a 
"good faith" defense for police officers enforcing assault laws 
against persons in the domestic setting. Such laws have been 
passed in other states to allay fears of civil liability for reasonable, 
good faith arrests of abusers. 132 
Since the police are usually the first to learn of abuse cases, 
and are often the only agency to deal with the problem, logically 
recordkeeping should begin at that level. Currently, most police 
departments do not segregate records of domestic violence from 
other forms of assault. 133 Since many calls for assistance do not 
result in legal action, it is also vital for meaningful statistical col-
130. T Ex. ConE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
131. Comment , supra note 67, at 427. 
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134.3 (Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 133.310 (1979). See 
Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REv. 59, 68 
(1982). 
133. J . HAMOS, supra note 101, at 7. 
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lection that information about such calls be kept in a form permit-
ting easy retrieval and comparison. Police departments rarely keep 
such records. 13• 
This kind of information-gathering would assist problem solv-
ing only if it conformed to strict collection and dissemination crite-
ria. Individual police departments should send data to a central 
state agency responsible for such statistical compilation and evalu-
ation so that data may be fed back to the reporting agencies or 
those involved in planning within the systems concerned with 
abuse. 1311 This central agency should release information only in 
statistical form to criminal justice, judicial, or social agencies for 
planning purposes. 
The method of collection and dissemination of data must in-
clude measures to protect the privacy of the abuse victim. The leg-
islature should enact express exemptions to the Open Records 
Act136 to assure the privacy of abuse victims. This cannot, of 
course, prevent divulgence of the name of a complainant in a crim-
inal case to the defendant or his attorney, but could curtail the 
present public accessibility of such information. 
Police should be aware of what social service agencies are 
available and should refer victims to these resources. That rarely 
happens; however, when it does, it depends solely upon the indus-
triousness of the individual officer. Clearly, the only efficient 
method of establishing this link between police and noncriminal 
justice resources lies with the agencies. From the practical stand-
point, these social services must carry the responsibility of making 
themselves known to the police. 
Several states have enacted legislation requiring police to fur-
nish certain information to abuse victims.137 This typically includes 
an outline of possible civil and criminal remedies, along with some 
statement of the officer's duties in providing medical assistance or 
protection. 138 
The most common proposal for police education of abuse vic-
tims involves requiring officers to pass out cards containing statu-
134. Id. 
135. The Domestic Violence Assistance Act proposed in the U.S. Senate in 1978 pro-
vided such a central clearinghouse of information within the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare. S. 2759, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REc. 23,633 (1978). 
136. TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
137. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1983-1984). 
138. ld. 
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torily defined information. 139 This procedure is attractive in several 
respects. First, it places the burden of dissemination on the group 
most likely to recognize abuse situations and to whom victims most 
often may be expected to turn for assistance. Second, giving this 
task to police raises their level of recognition of the problem and 
affords them the means of helping the victim. Finally, informing 
the victim about the duties of the police leaves officers little room 
for avoidance of their responsibilities in the abuse situation. 
3. The Prosecutorial Role. The prosecutor should answer le-
gal questions from abuse victims. In some cities prosecutors have 
developed programs stressing the importance of abuse cases. 140 
Specifically, the prosecution of abuse has been given priority in Se-
attle, Washington; Santa Barbara, California; Los Angeles, Califor-
nia; and Westchester County, New York.141 While the specific 
methods employed differ, the approaches used by each of these 
agencies alter the traditional methods of handling abuse and show 
that improved prosecution is possible. 
Rather than filing abuse cases in the same ·way as other as-
saults, these innovative programs require that spousal assaults re-
ceive special attention. The prosecutors screen the cases initially to 
determine whether the victim will cooperate; then the extent and 
history of the assaultive behavior and the legal sufficiency of the 
case are examined. 142 Special handling of abuse cases does not nec-
essarily lead to acceptance of more cases for already burdened 
caseloads. It does, however, permit the rejection of cases at an ear-
lier stage when it is clear that prosecution is undesirable or unsuit-
able.143 The prosecutor should explain legal options to complain-
ants at the same time he is evaluating victim cooperation. If the 
139. Lerman, Criminal Prosecution of Wife Beaters, RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE 
FAMILY, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 19; Trent, supra note 63, at 14. The police should only be re-
quired to provide information about the location and availability of legal assistance, medical 
care, shelter, and counseling services. Providing legal advice on a three-by-five card may 
mislead and potentially injure the victim. Information about the police role should be very 
general to retain flexibility in the police response; the police should not be bound to the 
black-and-white rules of arbitrary, printed instructions. Handled properly, the police-issut~d 
information card is a practical way to apprise victims of their recourse; it should not at-
tempt to answer all of their questions. 
140. For a more detailed discussion of several pilot projects, see Lerman, supra note 
139, at 5. 
141. /d. 
142. /d. 
143. /d. 
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prosecutor rejects the case, the complainant will understand better 
the deficiencies that led to the decision and be less likely to give up 
on the legal system. If a case survives the screening process, the 
complainant will also understand better what testimony is ex-
pected from the victim, how long the case will take to be tried, the 
punishment possibilities, and other legal alternatives to the prob-
lem. This screening process results in stronger cases for the prose-
cutor as well as prepared and willing complainants. Conviction 
rates would undoubtedly improve after such screening. Further-
more, persons whose cases were rejected would be less frustrated 
and might turn to appropriate social services for assistance. 
Without care, overly aggressive prosecution can become insen-
sitive prosecution and can be as damaging to the victim as the re-
fusal to treat abuse seriously. For this reason, district and county 
attorneys should, if possible, assign specific investigators or prose-
cutors to handle spouse abuse cases. These people should be aware 
of the community resources available to victims and be available to 
assist in training police in this work. Even when it is impractical to 
assign specific personnel to work exclusively on abuse, these cases 
should not be handled routinely by every prosecutor on the staff or 
erratically assigned to the inexperienced members of the office. If 
the criminal justice system treats the prosecution of abuse as a pri-
ority, other segments of society may someday view it as a priority 
as well. 
C. Dispositional Alternatives 
Spousal assaults resemble any assault in the substantive sense, 
but one cannot equate the sanctions for family violence with socie-
tal needs in the prosecution of other crimes.144 For the family unit 
to survive a criminal prosecution, the judge must recognize the im-
pact a jail sentence will have. For example, if the defendant is the 
family breadwinner, confinement will punish the whole family by 
cutting off its source of income. This problem increases if the de-
fendant loses his job as a result of the confinement. In this regard, 
imposition of a fine is less damaging to the family in the long run, 
although the immediate impact may be just as devastating. 
But the disadvantages of incarceration do not mean that the 
judge should exclude it as a possible sanction in every case that 
144. For a contrary view, see Trent, supra note 63, at 21. 
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economic detriment might occur. m In many such cases, the judge 
can sentence defendants to a county work-release program that en-
ables the prisoner to attend his job during the day and return to a 
minimum security jail at night and during weekends.146 This ap-
proach demonstrates to the prisoner the willingness of the court to 
order confinement while it recognizes the needs of the family and 
the responsibility of the offender to continue support. 
Judges often prefer probation to incarceration because of the 
nature of the crime, the potential damage to the defendant and the 
overcrowding of jails. Unfortunately, if defendants routinely re-
ceive probation in abuse cases without consideration of the needs 
of the defendant and victim, probation may be worse than no pun-
ishment at all. Probation without conditions is a dangerous encour-
agement to further abuse. Instead, courts should work to condition 
probation if it is granted. The_sentence should require the defen-
dant to attend alcohol or drug abuse counseling, 147 spouse abuse 
counseling, or other counseling for problems contributing to the 
abuse. The court might also require the defendant to compensate 
the victim of the crime or pay for medical expenses incurred as a 
result of the assault, as and it should expressly prohibit further 
abuse. .·' .. ~ . . 
The supervision of . liP, .A.~ser should begin long before sen-
tencing. Conditioning pr.~~~ial · ..release . on terms like those fre-
quently found in a tem·pO~ restraining order is one way to offer 
some protection to the . v.ic,Ujn. i•• :While only a few states have 
passed specific statutes peimitting judges to establish such condi-
tions for release, 1110 judges ge1,1erally have broad discretion in this 
~ _.::·.;j ~ .;. \ ;~-~~~ ,.e.; ... , . ,..  . 
145. I d. ·} l.fJ". ~';'~~~-; ::_.; ~· .. :n ~- . 
146. Statutory work release il 'ri<lw -J}ossible in Texas for offenses punishable by con-
finement in a county jail or third degree felonies. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 586, § 4, 1983 
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3792 (Vernon) '(to be codified at TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 
42.03, § 6). Unfortunately, the amendment is of little practical use in abuse situations be-
cause it requires a jury finding that the defendant did not cause a bodily injury. I d. County 
work release statutes do provide that money earned by a prisoner be paid to the victim 
through the sheriff for support and restitution, an ideal scheme in abuse cases. I d. § 1 (to be 
codified at TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.03, § 6). 
147. The magistrate setting bond may now require participation in a drug or alcohol 
abuse program as a condition of release. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 551, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. 
Law Serv. 3206 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.40); id. § 2 
(to be codified at TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc ANN. art. 22.021). 
148. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(m) (Vernon 1979). 
149. Lerman, supra note 139, at 10; Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 192. 
150. See Lerman, supra note 139, at 10. Under a new Texas law, probation officers 
may develop pretrial release programs and diversionary programs. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 
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area. To reinforce and facilitate such measures, Texas needs spe-
cific statutory authorization for courts to condition the release of 
prisoners in spousal abuse cases on terms designed, at least, to pro-
tect victims from further abuse pending trial. For greater effective-
ness, such a statute should also permit conditioning release on par-
ticipation in rehabilitative programs. As a concomitant feature, the 
court might be permitted to divert the offender and eventually dis-
miss the case upon a showing of successful completion of a rehabil-
itative program. uu 
All of the methods suggested, from the pretrial stage to the 
sentencing stage, are tools of the court, prosecutor, and even the 
defense attorney. Working in the adversarial system, such diverse 
options can promote the punishment or rehabilitation of abusers 
while offering protection to victims. 
D. Protective Orders 
In 1979, the Texas Legislature established a separate civil pro-
cedure specifically dealing with some of the more common 
problems of abuse. This addition to the Family Code1112 made pro-
tective orders, a form of injunctive relief, available for family vio-
lence situations when no divorce is pending. In adopting this mea-
sure, the legislature followed a national trend that has seen all but 
six states pass similar protective order statutes.1113 
These statutes attempt to fill the void between divorce and 
other civil or criminal remedies for family violence. Although the 
details of the acts differ from state to state, most are es'sentially 
equitable in nature and merely codify the right of a person to ob-
tain an injunction and certain ancillary relief where a divorce is 
762, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4572 (Vernon) (amending TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. 
art. 42.12, § 10(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). 
151. Besides work release, refer to note 145 supra, Texas law contains an additional 
applicable sentencing alternative. When alcohol has contributed to the abuse, as is often the 
case when an arrest has been made, misdemeanor judges, including municipal court judges, 
may remand a defendant to an authorized alcohol treatment facility for up to 90 days in lieu 
of imposition of sentence. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561c, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983). This limited device lies dormant, waiting for application in appropriate cases, many 
of which are abuse-related. Its application should be expanded to include treatment of other 
contributory problems linked with abuse. This kind of treatment vehicle would go a long 
way toward eliminating the systemic reluctance to punish abusers. 
152. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
153. Lerman, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE 
FAMILY, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 1. 
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undesirable.1a. These acts make long-overdue attempts to deal spe-
cifically with abuse. 
Under Title IV of the Texas Family Code, any member of a 
"family" or "household" is eligible to apply for protective orders.11111 
This expansive approach includes anyone related by consanguinity 
or affinity including former spouses, foster children and parents, 
and persons living together in the same dwelling, even if unre-
lated.ue The broad scope of eligibility greatly enhances the effec-
tiveness of this measure by eliminating unrealistic restrictions. 
In states limiting the eligibility for protective orders to mar-
ried adults, many single cohabitants or former spouses suffer abuse 
without the same recourse afforded married persons. In Texas, 
framing the statute to include all such combinations not only recti-
tied the harshness of narrow limitations, but avoided problematical 
interpretations of the common-law marriage status. 
The inclusion of former spouses, children, parents, or even 
strangers living together in a single household appropriately ad-
dresses the variety of interpersonal assaultive conduct that de-
stroys the lives of cohabiting groups. If such groups are the fabric 
of modern society, whether or not they resemble the traditional 
family unit, society's interests dictate the same protection to them 
that is accorded spouses. 
A related concern is whether any person other than the victim 
of abuse may apply for relief. The Texas statute permits filing of 
an application by any adult member of a family or household for 
the protection of the filing adult or any other member of the fam-
ily or household, including a child member.m This provision ap-
plies even if the person filing the application no longer lives in the 
same household as the alleged abuser.m While this procedure ob-
viously benefits abused children and adult victims who are hospi-
talized, in hiding, or physically or financially incapable of filing for 
themselves, it also benefits those who are simply unsure of their 
154. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (protection 
of the family). 
155. ld. § 71.01(b)(3), (4). 
156. ld. 
157. ld. § 71.04(b), amended by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. 3857 (Vernon). An application may be filed for a child by any adult, whether or not a 
member of the household. ld. § 71.04(b)(2). The recent amendments to the Act allow any 
prosecuting attorney in the county court to file for protective orders for any person alleged 
to be the victim of family violence. ld. (to be codified at id. § 71.04(b)(3)). 
158. Id. § 71.04(c). 
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desire to pursue a legal remedy. In this respect, Texas law is more 
accommodating than that of many states. 1119 
But, prior to the recent amendment of the Texas Family 
Code, 160 protective orders did not accommodate the class of vic-
tims who were in the process of obtaining a divorce. If the appli-
cant filed for divorce, any application for a protective order was 
dismissed. 161 To further this prohibition, every application re-
quired a statement that no suit for dissolution of the marriage was 
pending. 1611 Lawmakers apparently considered temporary orders 
adequate protection for parties in a pending divorce. Virtually no 
other state shared this position with Texas, 163 and the logic of this 
provision was not apparent. If a protective order was in effect 
before the divorce action was filed, there was no need to duplicate 
in the divorce court what had already been accomplished by the 
protective order. On a more elementary level, it seems unnecessary 
to have required an abuse victim to pay twice for the same result. 
The former Texas concept forced the applicant to choose between 
continued protection without pursuing divorce and vulnerability 
until divorce was granted. 
Continued protection was also lacking when divorce was the 
first step. If the victim wanted protection during the pendency of 
the divorce, he obtained a temporary injunction which, in turn, 
was replaced with a protective order after the divorce was final. 
The Texas Legislature amended the statute in 1983 to resolve 
this problem.164 Under the current statutory scheme, a petitioner 
may request a protective order in the divorce court during pen-
159. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-7. 
160. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon) (to be 
codified at TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. ~.581) (making protective orders available to a party 
seeking divorce upon motion as part ONiivorce action); Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 4, 
1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon) (amending TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon 
Supp. 1982-1983)) (making applications for protective orders available to parties if filed 
before filing divorce action); id. § 5 (amending TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.13(b) (Vernon 
Supp. 1982-1983)) (making conflicting orders of court with jurisdiction over divorce or an-
nulment proceedings prevail over conflicting orders of court with jurisdiction over parties in 
divorce suit- as in an application for a protective order filed prior to divorce proceed-
ings--only to the extent of actual conflict). 
161. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June 
19, 1983, ch. 607, § 4, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon). 
162. TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
163. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-5. 
164. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon) (to be 
codified at TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 3.581). 
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dency of the marriage dissolution. 16a Such an order remains valid 
until the court vacates or dismisses the suit or orders a final decree 
of divorce. 166 If a conflict arises between an order of the divorce 
court and any existing protective order, the order obtained in the 
court dissolving the marriage prevails. 167 
Unfortunately, this amendment perpetuates, in part, the judi-
cial inefficiency of the original statute. By terminating the protec-
tive order upon finality of the divorce or annulment decree, the law 
cuts off continued protection at a time when it may be needed 
most. The divorced abuse victim must then either initiate suit for 
another protective order or accept the risk that a former spouse 
will continue to be abusive. 168 It would be far more effective to per-
mit the divorce court to choose whether to terminate a protective 
order. The statute will remain procedurally deficient until this 
change is made. 
A protective statute may limit the types of abuse covered as 
well as the eligibility of applicants. Since the primary objective of 
the protective order is to prevent "family violence" as defined in 
the statute,169 the statute should avoid over-restrictive definitions 
of violent behavior. 
The Texas statute addresses only the "intentional" use of 
physical force. Lesser degrees of culpability are apparently beyond 
the scope of the protective order in Texas.170 Similarly, 
"threatened" abuse is a form of "family violence" but "attempted" 
abuse is not.171 Nor is every form of sexual abuse of a child or 
adult within the statutory definition, since "physical force" is the 
determinative factor under the provision as no~itten.172 These 
anomalies might not have existed had the statut~rowed the 
~ 165. ld. 166. ld. 
167. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 5, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon) 
(amending TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). 
168. Apparently, if the protective order is sought in a separate action prior to divorce 
proceedings, and no conflicting order is entered by the divorce court, then the protective 
order will not terminate upon finality of the divorce or annulment unless the court with 
jurisdiction over the separate action frames the order so to terminate. Id. § 4 (amending 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (making applications for protective 
orders available to parties if filed before filing divorce action). 
169. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
170. ld. 
171. ld. 
172. ld. 
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concept of "bodily injury" from the Texas Penal Code173 to supple-
ment the "physical force" requirement. For instance, if the statute 
also prohibited the infliction or attempted infliction of bodily in-
jury, the emphasis on the result as well as the means would have 
permitted broader interpretation of proscribed acts. 
To protect a victim from further abuse, the court must antici-
pate the ways the abuser might inflict physical or psychological 
mistreatment and shape its relief to avoid such a possiblity. The 
abuser may try to circumvent the intent of the court's order by 
obeying the literal words of the order but imaginatively employing 
means calculated to continue the abuse. In its effort to prevent 
such circumvention, the court may use its past experience to ad-
vantage. Specifically, Texas law permits the court to prohibit the 
abuser from directly or indirectly communicating with the appli-
cant or going to or near the residence, place of employment, or any 
other place where the applicant may be.174 These measures usually 
work well in divorce cases and should prove broad enough to deal 
with the harassment that often accompanies physical abuse. 
A vital part of the relief available is granting exclusive use of 
the family domicile to one of the parties.1711 The Texas statute con-
templates diverse living situations and permits such orders 
whether the residence is jointly owned or leased by the parties, 
owned or leased by the party granted possession, or owned or 
leased by the party denied possession if that party has a child sup-
port obligation.176 
The court may augment the award of exclusive possession of 
the domicile by a~ order granting use and possession of any other 
specific communitY'Qr jointly owned property to one of the par-
ties177 and prohibitin~the transfer of such property by the parties 
during the pendency of'the protective order.178 This measure is 
173. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(7) (Vernon 1974). 
174. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.1l(a)(1)(B), (C) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (to be re-
codified at id. § 71.11(b)(2), (3)). 
175. ld. § 71.11(a)(2). 
176. ld. § 71.11(a)(2)(A)-(C). 
177. Id. § 71.11(a)(6). This provision is especially important for at least two reasons. 
First, the victim of abuse has enough problems without having to find another place to live. 
If the applicant retains custody of children during the period covered by the protective 
order, the interests of the children are often best served by allowing them to remain with 
the parent in possession of the family residence. Second, the abuser rightly bears the 
financial and physical burden of a new residence. 
178. ld. § 71.1l(a)(1)(E) (to be recodified at id. § 71.11(a)(1)(B)) . 
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often useful to prevent the kind of retaliatory actions associated 
with divorce and may assist in apportioning the property according 
to need. 
Merely awarding an applicant the domicile and specific items 
of property, however, is not always sufficient.179 If the abuser is not 
required to provide sufficient financial support to pay for necessi-
ties and housing, many applicants may be deterred from asking the 
court to order the removal of the abuser. The Texas statute per-
mits support payments for a party or child of a party if an obliga-
tion to provide support exists. 180 
Although this support provision does not apply to unmarried 
cohabitants, it contributes measurably toward the continued shel-
ter and feeding of many victims. This approach may be preferable 
to an order to pay only the rent or house payment since it is broad 
enough to accommodate those victims who want to move from 
their former domicile and live in a new residence or in an abuse 
shelter. 
In addition to making support and property awards, the court 
may require counseling with a social worker, family service agency, 
physician, psychologist, or other qualified person.181 Statutory pro-
visions, however, do not require that fees for this treatment be 
paid by the abuser. Perhaps lawmakers considered such payments 
self-defeating, since the money would often come from community 
funds. The court sho ld, however, be empowered to deal with each 
case individually, especiallY-since no community fund impediment 
exists when the abuser and victim are not married. 
Further, the Texas support provisions do not compensate the 
victim for damages resulting from the abuse. While the victim may 
bring a collateral suit for damages against the abuser, judicial effi-
ciency would be increased if the court awarded compensation at 
the same time that it issued protective orders. The abuser should 
compensate the victim for medical care, lost wages, counseling, or 
other expenses without regard to the marital status or support ob-
ligation of the parties. 18~ With the abrogation of interspousal tort 
immunity in Texas, the victim of abuse is entitled to compensation 
for the results of intentional torts committed by the attacker.183 
179. See, e.g., Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 162. 
180. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.11(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
181. Id. § 71.1l(a)(5). 
182. J . HAMOS, supra note 101, at 23. 
183. Refer to notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text. 
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Clearly, courts should settle this claim in the most expeditious and 
judicially economical manner possible. 
The Texas act does not allow the court to order the abuser to 
pay court costs or attorney's fees. 184 The availability of attorney's 
fees for successful claimants under the Texas Crime Victims Com-
pensation Act highlights the inequity of this limitation. 1811 If the 
state must repay costs and fees, surely a private party should bear 
this responsibility when there is evidence of wrongdoing. The ef-
fect of the Texas act's failure to provide for such recovery is the 
effective denial of relief to those unable to pay. 186 
Finally, in a broad grant of equitable power, a Texas court 
may prohibit specific acts by an abuser to prevent or reduce the 
likelihood of further family violence. 187 Proper use of this provision 
may anticipate and deter specific violent, threatening, or harassing 
conduct. 
Protective orders have been available in Texas for over four 
years, but, like tort actions, there have been relatively few applica-
tions for this remedy. One explanation for the limited use of this 
. protective device may be the lack of procedural effectiveness and 
efficiency inherent in the legislation. 
Requiring formality in a petition seeking damages in major 
business litigation probably does not affect the availability of such 
relief, while the same formality required in a petition for protective 
orders could effectively preclude availability of the remedy to those 
it is intended to help.188 Not all abuse victims are unable to pay for 
'rep~ntation, but it is obvious that many victims of abuse will be 
unable to_ finance even the least expensive kinds of assistance. Al-
though pro se filing of applications for protective orders is permit-
ted under the Texas statute, 189 an abuse victim acting pro se will 
184. Many other states provide such relief. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-5. 
185. TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
186. If a prosecuting attorney obtains a protective order for the victim, the abuser 
may be ordered to pay costs and attorney's fees to the government, but costs and fees re-
main unavailable for private practitioners. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. 
Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.04(e)). Note that filing 
fees or other court costs may be waived for an applicant other than a prosecuting attorney 
upon a showing that the applicant is unable to pay. ld. (amending TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 
71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). Refer to notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text. 
187. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.11(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
188. Lerman, Civil Protection Orders: Obtaining Access to Court, 3 RESPONSE TO VI-
OLENCE IN THE FAMILY Apr. 1980, at 1. 
189. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June 
19, 1983, ch. 607, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon). 
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have difficulty invoking the equitable power of the court and un-
derstanding and selecting suitable relief under the law.190 The 
Texas law governing application for protective orders has estab-
lished clear and relatively uncomplicated requirements. 191 Consid-
ering the rather limited relief options available, 192 form applica-
tions should suffice at least to initiate an action. 
Other states have aided applicants for protective orders by 
preparing form petitions, requiring court clerks to assist applicants 
with filing, and advising victims of their right to such relief at the 
police and prosecutorial levels.193 Form petitions do not, of course, 
eliminate the need for competent professional representation in 
these proceedings. Nevertheless, the use of form applications and 
orders should reduce the cost of legal assistance since legal fees 
depend on the amount of work required in a specific case. 
Tacitly acknowledging this cost factor, the legislature origi-
nally set the filing fee for protective orders at sixteen dollars.194 
This effort was praiseworthy but inadequate to accomplish its pur-
pose. The legislature amended the fee provision in 1983 to permit 
waiver of filing fees and costs upon a showing of inability to pay.19& 
Further, an applicant is entitled to a hearing on indigency within 
three days of the filing of a request for waiver of fees and costs, 
eliminating much of the potential for delay in a waiver 
procedure. 196 1 
Providing legal assistance ;for those unable to pay may be more 
important tB:~n alleviating costs. If the 1egislature does not sim-
plify the applica!ion or authorize clerical assistance from the court, 
some form of pWf-essional help is essential. Legal Aid or other 
forms of free clinical assistance are vastly overburdened.197 While 
such assistance might eventually become available, it would proba-
bly come too late to meet the more immediate needs of serious 
190. See Lerman, supra note 188, at 1. 
191. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN.§ 71.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June 
19, 1983, ch. 607, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon). 
192. /d. § 71.11, amended by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. 4047 (Vernon). Refer to text accompanying notes 200-20 infra. 
193. See Lerman, supra note 188, at 1; Lerman, supra note 153, at 6-7. 
194. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of 
June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon). 
195. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon) 
(amending TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). 
196. /d . 
197. Lerman, supra note 188, at 1. 
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abuse victims. The overcrowding of free legal services testifies elo-
quently to the need for such services. Since there is little chance 
that court-appointed attorneys will become routine in civil cases in 
the near future, only one apparent alternative remains. The prose-
cutor who represents the victim in the criminal abuse case should 
also handle the protective order.198 No doubt prosecutors would 
oppose the addition of protective orders to their already heavy 
workload, but no other alternative appears to protect the rights of 
the victim. It makes economic sense to spend part of the 
prosecutorial budget on protective orders, since these orders 
should reduce the criminal caseload of spousal assaults. 
The 1983 Texas Family Code amendments facilitate 
prosecutorial involvement. Specifically, a prosecuting attorney may 
file an application for a protective order and recover attorney's fees 
payable to the fund from which salaries are paid to prosecutors. 199 
The 1983 amendments greatly improve the potential availabil-
ity of protective orders, but until the problems of filing applica-
tions, paying court costs, and making representation available are 
resolved in favor of the victim, the Texas statute is effective only 
for those most likely to have the entire range of civil and criminal 
remedies already at their disposal. When the procedural require-
ments for protective orders become as simple and inexpensive as 
those for peace bonds, protective orders will assume the same role 
with much greater potential benefit to the applicants. 
1. Ex Parte and Emergency Relief. The effectiveness of a protec~de~e rests upon the speed and ease with which an ap-
plicant can obtailrit~xas law only partially meets that test. 
The Texas statute does not permit emergency orders to be issued 
at times when courts are typically not in session. If the offender is 
arrested, there are still no guarantees that the abuser will not be 
released on bond before the victim can obtain any temporary or-
ders or other protection. 
The applicant can obtain emergency orders if there is a "clear 
198. ld. 
199. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon) (to be 
codified at TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.04(b)(3), (e)). Regarding which prosecuting attorneys 
may file on behalf of an applicant, the amendments allow any prosecuting attorney to file 
"who serves the county in which the application is to be filed and who represents the state 
in a district or county court for the protection of any person alleged to be a victim of family 
violence." ld. (to be codified at TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.04(b)(3)). 
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and present danger" of family violence, and the court may issue 
such orders ex parte. 200 The application must contain facts con-
cerning the violence and the need for immediate protective orders, 
and it must be verified under oath by the applicant, a process simi-
lar to that of application for a temporary restraining order in a 
divorce. 201 
Unfortunately, the law fails to specify a method for having an 
emergency order granted on weekends or holidays, late at night, or 
wh~n the court is not sitting. While some populous counties in 
Texas may have judges willing to be contacted at home to issue 
such orders, many districts have only one judge serving many 
counties, and he may not be available for several days. 
If the victim does obtain an ex parte order, it is valid for only 
twenty days, 202 though it may be extended on the motion of the 
applicant or on the court's own motion for further twenty-day pe-
riods as necessary.208 This procedure may possibly violate due pro-
cess because it potentially deprives the respondent of property for 
an indefinite time without a hearing. The respondent must file a 
motion to vacate an ex parte order to bring the matter to a hearing 
on the merits.1104 This places the burden of setting the case for 
hearing on the respondent, which may cause injury if the respon-
dent is unable for some reason to file such a motion. 
2. Duration of Orders. When the court has heard the appli-
cation for a protective order, it may enter an order granting relief 
for any period up to one year.1011 Any party or the court itself may 
move to modify in ~respect, except to extend the order's dura-
tion. 206 Although a secondi>r~ctive order is presumably available 
to an applicant immediately upon the expiration of the first, the 
first order terminates by operation of a~-.2!..This relieves the par-
ties of the need to move for termination of the order. In addition, 
the police and other agencies involved in the enforcement of the 
order can quickly determine the termination date even if no date 
appears in the court's order. 
200. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
201. ld. § 71.05(e). 
202. ld. § 71.15(b). 
203. ld. § 71.15(c). 
204. ld. § 71.15(e). 
205. Id. § 71.13(a). 
206. Id. § 71.14. 
207. See id. §§ 71.13-.14. 
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3. Enforcement. Enforcement of the protective order is es-
sential. If there is no swift and sure method of punishing violations 
of the order, it is unlikely to deter abusers. The two principal 
methods of enforcing such orders are contempt and criminal sanc-
tion. The drafters of the Texas statute obviously attempted to in-
corporate both approaches, but without success. 
The Texas law specifically requires that the following language 
be included in every protective order and that it appear in bold-
face type or capital letters: 
A person who violates this order may be punished for contempt of 
court by a fine of as much as $500 or by confinement in jail for as 
long as six months, or both.108 
Although this kind of warning is unusual, the idea is meritorious 
because · the written threat of punishment is a constant and clear 
reminder to the person restrained. 
Contempt alone is insufficient to enforce protective orders for 
the same reasons discussed in connection with restraining orders 
and temporary injunctions. 209 The mere availability of contempt as 
an enforcement tool may even diminish punishment for violations. 
If a protective order is in effect and the violator commits an act 
that would otherwise be a felony or class A misdemeanor assault, 
the court will be reluctant to prosecute if it can opt for contempt 
proceedings. Unfortunately, the most serious punishment pre-
scribed for criminal contempt is far less than that prescribed for 
any but the least serious assault. 210 
A contempt hearing may be scheduled weeks after the viola-
tion and has many of the attendant disadvantages of a criminal 
trlal._ Delays in contempt proceedings substantially increase a risk 
of coritinued violence. Additionally, prior to the 1983 amendment, 
Texas law ... did not empower police agencies to arrest for violation 
of a protective order.211 Some states resolved this problem by mak-
ing violations indirect criminal contempt for which police may 
208. ld. § 71.16(a). 
209. Refer to notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. 
210. See Eisenberg & Seymour, An Overview of Legal Remedies for Battered Women, 
TRIAL, Aug. 1979, at 28, 29. Compare TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 1911 (Vernon 1964) 
(district courts may punish for contempt by fine not to exceed $100 and by imprisonment 
not to exceed three days) with TEx. PENAL ConE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) 
(classifying some assaults as class C misdemeanors) and TEx. PENAL ConE ANN. § 12.23 
(Vernon 1974) (class C misdemeanor punishable by fine not to exceed $200). 
211. Refer to notes 214-19 infra and accompanying text. 
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make a warrantless arrest. 212 In Pennsylvania, the offense need not 
occur in the presence of the police and there is no right to trial by 
jury for the violation. 213 
The old Texas statute attempted to involve police agencies in 
the enforcement of protective orders in an unusual way. The law 
required, in addition to the language warning of contempt penal-
ties, that each protective order contain the following wording: 
A violation of this order by commission of family violence may be 
a criminal offense punishable by a fine of as much as $2,000 or by 
confinement in jail for as long as one year, or both.214 
This wording created confusion concerning the legislative intent. 
The language did not create a crime because it merely implied that 
the conduct was criminal. It was also possible to interpret the 
warning of criminal prosecution as simply a restatement of the 
possible penalties for assault existing in the Texas Penal Code. If 
so, this caveat was seriously inaccurate because it described only 
one misdemeanor assault penalty range when other misdemeanor 
or felony assaults might be involved.111 This tacit degrading of all 
levels of assault to a lesser penalty range misled the very person it 
meant to deter. 
Finally, in 1983, the legislature amended the penal code by ad-
ding a provision specifically criminalizing the intentional or know-
ing violation of a protective order.118 The offense entails an act of 
family violence, direct communication with a member of the family 
or household in a threatening or harassing manner, or presence at 
or near the re~ce__ir place of employment in violation of a pro-
tective order.217 Any oNI:!ese violations of the protective order is 
punishable as a class B miSd~eanor,118 and the offender remains 
subject to prosecution for any crime committed while violating the 
order.219 . ~ 
This change in the law clarifies the language required in the 
212. Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 163. 
213. See, e.g., PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 10190(a), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1983). See also 
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 163. 
214. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.16(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (emphasis added). 
215. See TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (allowing some 
assaults to be tried as felonies). 
216. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4049 (Vernon) (to be 
codified at TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 25.08). 
217. Jd. (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(a)(1)-(3)). 
218. ld. (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 25.08(d)). 
219. ld. (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 25.08(c)). 
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protective order, but it has a far more important function. It 
finally provides police the statutory authorization to arrest those 
who violate a protective order rather than relegating enforcement 
to contempt proceedings. Whether police agencies will increase en-
forcement in abuse cases because of this amendment remains to be 
seen, but the law is now procedurally complete. 
The Texas law instituting protective orders already had one 
necessary predicate to unsupervised enforcement by the police. 
The statute required all municipal police departments and sheriffs 
to establish procedures to insure that officers have access to the 
names of persons protected by such orders.220 This requirement 
heightened police sensitivity to abuse cases and insured the availa-
bility of vital information to the officer in the field. Procedures en-
abling officers to contact judges or court personnel supervising pro-
tective orders would improve this data flow. Judges are commonly 
called upon to set bonds and arraign prisoners at inconvenient 
times; only slight additional attention is needed to provide the ju-
dicial supervision necessary to enforce these orders. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
.... -'· 
The primary purpose~ of ; le~~ .:r~medies to spouse abuse 
should be deterrence, pro.tecl,i,O~lt; ~~ .~o~pe~sation, in that order. 
In achieving these goals; :.n9:"~lt~jil,Wf._p.ative examined provides 
completely effective relief. · · 
To be effective, the choeeq··~~e!tJ..i:~~J.lst. also be readily availa-
ble. Therefore, procedute::Jllu~ii~~ent the substantive goals 
of any legal mechanism deSign~~t'Q':~ victims or combat abuse. 
Although laws requiring numerou·s ·l)ea1big.s, service of citation, for-
mal pleadings, and professional cQu,ni~g m,ay further desirable 
goals, they also n~llify the remedy f~),~ .- many abuse victims who 
cannot afford such procedures. While not every remedy need be 
available to every victim, ev.e..ry victim should have access to suffi-
cient and comprehen~ivc;l r~\l¢(: fwm ~buse. That goal is far from 
being realized. ·. >~· ' ' ;: . . 
The goals of economy and effectiveness suggest that priorities 
should be assigned to abuse remedies. If possible, the law should 
deter the potential abuser, and this focus must remain primary. 
Where deterrence fails, as it must in some cases, effective protec-
220. TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 71.18 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 
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tion of the potential victim becomes paramount. If law and society 
fail in these goals, compensatory and rehabilitative measures must 
be available. The essential challenge is to provide legal systems 
that are both effective and accessible. 
Each remedial alternative bearing upon spouse abuse should 
be strengthened, but particular attention should be paid to afford-
ing quick, sure, and readily available legal assistance to the vast 
number of people affected by abuse. It is hard to imagine any 
larger class of victims in such urgent need who have traditionally 
received so little assistance from the law. The Family Protection 
Act recognized that need in Texas, but one simple legislative 
stroke cannot resolve a problem of the proportions of spouse 
abuse. 
